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ABSTRACT
The Petite Amateur Navy Satellite (PANSAT) was
launched aboard the STS-95 Discovery Shuttle on 29
October 1998. PANSAT was inserted into a circular,
low-Earth orbit at an altitude of 550 km and 28.45°
inclination on 30 October 1998. PANSAT continues to
operate and support the educational mission at NPS
even after reaching its two-year design life. The
research aspect also continues with the analysis of the
accumulated telemetry data, in terms of how well the
spacecraft operated over the mission design life.
However, the store-and-forward mission using direct
sequence spread spectrum was never realized.
This paper describes the successes of the PANSAT
project in developing a functional, low-cost, small
satellite; and the lessons learned in designing largely
with industrial components. Specifically, the use of
commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) nickel-cadmium
batteries, sparse, yet judicious use of radiation-tolerant
devices, error-detection-and-correction (EDAC) system
RAM, and software design issues are discussed. The
inability to realize the spread spectrum communications
aspect is also presented.
Introduction
Officer students, faculty, and staff at the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS) designed, developed,
launched, and are operating a small satellite, the Petite
Amateur Navy Satellite (PANSAT). The main objective
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of the satellite is to provide hands-on educational
experience for the officer students. Two curricula in
Space Systems are offered at NPS, Space Systems
Engineering and Space Systems Operations1. Since the
first conceptual study of the spacecraft processor in
March 19892, more than fifty graduate theses were
published covering various topics.
A second objective was to demonstrate a low-cost,
digital communications satellite using commercial, off-
the-shelf components. Largely due to cost consider-
ations, PANSAT was designed without space-rated
components, such as batteries and processor. The
satellite is also a "single-string" system with a number
of single-points-of-failure in the design. Design trades
were made, cost for reliability, and simplicity for
capability. It was understood that PANSAT would be
an experimental satellite and that system reboots would
have to be accommodated, either due to environmental
effects or possible software errors (onboard or up-
loaded).
Another objective of PANSAT was to provide
digital communications using spread spectrum modula-
tion techniques offering a store-and-forward service to
the amateur radio community. Although successful
communications were made with the satellite to relay
telemetry and upload software, spread spectrum
communications were never performed with the
satellite.
Space Systems Engineering
The Space Systems Engineering curriculum at NPS
is a nine-quarter program with a core matrix of engi-
neering, math, and science courses, as well as some
management courses. Officer students receive a Master
of Science in one of five disciplines: Astronautical
Engineering, Computer Science, Electrical and Com-
1
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puter Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, and
Physics. In addition to completion of the core courses,
specialization sequences are required to meet the
requirements of the specific discipline. A written
Master's thesis is also required of all graduates.
Space Systems Operations
The Space Systems Operations curriculum at
NFS is an eight-quarter program with a broad technical
overview in space sciences and engineering. The focus
is more on the operations of space systems with an
emphasis on information technology, operations
analysis, and acquisition management. As with the
engineering curriculum, a Master's thesis is required.
Officer students in the Space Systems Operations
curriculum receive a Master of Science in Systems
Technology.
Spacecraft Description
PANSAT was designed with simplicity in mind.
With the exception of three microswitches used as
inhibit switches, there are no moving parts. The
spacecraft was designed as a tumbler with no attitude
control. This meant that the antenna would need to be
omnidirectional, and the body-mounted solar panels
would need to cover the spacecraft so that at any
orientation, energy conversion can occur. The space-
craft is basically composed of solar panels, electronics,
and the aluminum structure. Figure 1 shows the
PANSAT system block diagram with the radio fre-
quency (RF) section on the left, the digital control
electronics in the middle and the electrical power
subsystem (EPS) on the right. Although PANSAT uses
two nickel-cadmium (NiCd) batteries, they are not
redundant. Two batteries are required to allow for the
number of charge/discharge cycles over the desired
two-year mission life. PANSAT uses both silicon solar
cells and gallium-arsenide (GaAs) solar cells. One
GaAs solar panel is located on the launch vehicle
interface where a small user volume was available. The
higher efficiency GaAs cells were necessary because of
the limited area, but still provides much less energy
than the larger silicon cell panels. The digital control
subsystem (DCS) is built around a military version,
M80C186XL microprocessor and performs all the
command and data handling functions for the satellite.
Communications was designed for a simplex (or half-
duplex) channel to minimize frequency utilization.
PANSAT operates in the 70 cm UHF amateur radio
band, centered at 436.5 MHz. A more complete
discussion of the PANSAT subsystems is given by the
author3.









Figure 1. PANSAT System Block Diagram.
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The PANSAT spacecraft was designed to fly as a
secondary payload on the Shuttle as well as expendable
launch vehicles. Designing for the Shuttle presented a
Radiation Considerations
Initial PANSAT design requirements specified the
number of challenges which were addressed4. Figure 2 spacecraft be built using radiation hardened electronics,
shows a view of the PANSAT physical layout. Note Once it was determined that meeting this requirement
that some solar panels have been removed to allow for would be prohibitively expensive, our focus turned to
clarity in the illustration.
Figure 2, PANSAT Physical Layout
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identifying portions of the satellite where hardening
against single event effects (SEE) was necessary for
reliability and then also focused on operations methods
for mitigating the radiation effects.
Given the two-year mission duration and a 550 km
orbit, an evaluation of the radiation environment
determined that radiation total dose effects were not a
concern, leaving only single event effects such as
upsets, transients and latchups as the only radiation
effects to be addressed in the satellite design.
The approach to mitigating SEE's proceeded as
follows. A radiation hardened Error Detection and
Correction circuit was designed using the Harris (now
Intersil) ACS630MS ED AC chip. The ED AC system
can correct single bit errors (1-bit flip in a byte) in
system RAM and detect two-bit errors. In the case of a
two-bit error which is uncorrectable, the system
controller will stop resetting a watchdog (WDOG)
counter in the electrical power system. After approxi-
mately 90 seconds, the watchdog counter will power
down the system controller with the corrupted memory
and power on the backup system controller. The EPS
will continue to power on the alternate system control-
ler each time an uncorrectable error occurs.
In addition to bit flips in system RAM, it is
possible for the processor and support chips to latchup.
When latchup occurs, either communications with the
EPS via the peripheral control bus (PCB) can be
disrupted or the processor can go into a loop and fail to
reset the WDOG counter. Again the response from the
EPS when the WDOG timer times out is to power on
the alternate SC.
The electrical power system is simple in design. It
has no processor and the only digital components are
large-scale integration circuits (LSI) used in the PCB
interface, controlling power switching, the WDOG
function, and selecting analog multiplexer channels.
LSI digital logic circuits are less susceptible to SEE's
than system RAM and the SC processor. Susceptibility
is a function of transistor feature size and LSI logic has
larger transistor features than the SC processor. Large
enough, in fact that the EPS has not experienced any
latchups or failures, to our knowledge.
Throughout the satellite are analog circuits used to
multiplex, amplify and condition telemetry signals.
These analog circuits are susceptible to single event
transients, which add error to a signal. Most of the
transients are of short duration and are averaged out;
but on occasion, some transients are of very long
duration. It was fortunate for PANSAT that the long
duration transients have not affected operations.
Future satellite designs will need better methods of
mitigating long duration transients in telemetry mea-
surements. Latchup failures of digital circuits can be
minimized by identifying components where radiation
hardened versions would increase system reliability. In
addition, radiation reports for COTS components are
available on NASA, JPL and other web-sites that will
help identify some of the better COTS components with
regard to their tolerance to SEE's. Finally, as with
PANSAT, software methods will need to be employed
to minimize SEE effects.
Error-Detection-and-Correction (EDAC) Memory
The PANSAT spacecraft controller contains an
Intel M80C186XL microprocessor. This microproces-
sor uses 64 kbytes of ROM and 512 kbytes of RAM.
Error detection and correction circuitry provides single-
bit error correction with dual-bit error detection for all
of the microprocessor-addressable RAM. The error
detection and correction is accomplished using a
Hamming code to generate a check word (6 bits) for
each data word stored in memory. Using a sixteen-bit
data word requires six check bits. Thus, there are
actually 768 kbytes of RAM implemented with three
RAM devices where one device contains 256 kbytes
used for the check bits.
The memory system operates as follows. When a
data word is stored in memory, the associated check bits
are also stored (after being generated). During a
memory read operation the data word and correspond-
ing check bits are retrieved from memory. New check
bits based on the data word from the stored memory are
generated and compared with the stored check word. If
the two sets of check bits are identical, the data word is
assumed correct. Correctable errors (one bit) are
identified and corrected and the microprocessor is
notified via an interrupt. Uncorrectable data words
which are detected notify the microprocessor via an
interrupt as well.
The PANSAT ED AC circuitry was first designed
by Oechsel5 and then modified and implemented for the
actual flight processor by Horning6. The design is a
memory bus controller using a commercially available
ED AC 1C, the ACS630MS. The controller implements
a sequential state machine to generate the required
control signals for the RAM (Mosaic MSM-8256 static
RAM), provides transceivers and latches to isolate the
RAM data bus from the microprocessor local bus, and
coordinates the operations of the ED AC 1C.
The ED AC system was implemented with a 16-bit
memory system to reduce the number of RAM devices
required for storing the check bits. This complicated
the design but the trade off for reduced power was
necessary. The M80C186XL is a 16-bit microproces-
sor, compatible with the 80186. The 16-bit bus allows
both byte (eight bit) and word (16 bit) memory opera-
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tions. This multi-mode memory interface requires both
byte and word memory accesses. However, all data in
RAM are stored as 16-bit words. Thus, a byte opera-
tion requires the adjacent byte to be accessed as well
since the check bits are for 16-bit words only. Imple-
mentation of the ED AC system to allow byte-wide data
accesses without needing to work with the adjacent byte
would require 10 check bits, five for the lower eight
bits and five more for the upper eight bits. This would
require two RAM devices for the check bits. The state
machine logic is simpler but the power saved from
removing one RAM device more than compensates for
the design complexity.
In addition, the write back control to RAM was
designed to reduce the number of writes to RAM. The
straightforward design requires every word accessed
from memory to be written back to memory, regardless
if there is an error or not. This insures that the memory
controller automatically corrects the error in the data
word that is sent to the CPU as well as the original data
word in RAM. This write back occurs within the time
envelope of the CPU read and write cycles and does not
affect the timing. However, writing back after every
memory access does increase the power consumed
substantially since correctable errors seldom occur (e.g.
about one per day). The write back control logic was
designed to only write back when there is a correctable
error.
Of all the ICs for the ED AC circuitry and the
microprocessor only the ACS630MS is a radiation
hardened device. All other circuitry (state machine
logic, bus transceivers, microprocessor, etc.) are MIL-
STD-883, non radiation hardened components. How-
ever, the PANS AT spacecraft controller computer board
contains several ICs which are neither radiation
hardened nor MIL-STD-883. All components are of at
least industrial grade (e.g. -40° C to +85 ° C) quality.
Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Batteries
NiCd batteries have historically been a popular
secondary power source for small satellite designs. A
properly designed battery where cell capacities are
matched and the proper charging scheme is utilized can
result in a battery that will last 3000 cycles or more.
Initial design requirements for PANSAT specified two
NiCd batteries. This requirement was driven by a desire
for redundancy. As the design progressed, it become
apparent that two batteries were needed, not for
redundancy, but to enable the satellite to meet the
mission design life. For PANSAT's low earth orbit
there are approximately 16 eclipses every day. For a
satellite with one battery this would equate to approxi-
mately 2900 cycles in 6 months time, which is nearly
equivalent to the mission design goal. To lower the
number of cycles per day, the batteries are operated as
follows. One battery will charge for 4 orbits and the
other battery will supply power in eclipse. Each eclipse
depletes a battery capacity by approximately 10%.
Operating the batteries in this method equates to
operating each battery to a 40% depth of discharge
before it is recharged. As a result battery cycles were
reduced to two per day per battery.
To date, the NiCd batteries have performed well.
Both batteries met the design mission life requirements
of 2 years and are now in their third year of operation.
Battery B is presently showing signs of wear and has
had some cells short. The shorts subsequently burned
through and the battery is working again though at a
moderately reduced capacity. Battery A has performed
well but a slightly reduced capacity shows it is wearing
out. No answer is available for the difference in how
each battery has performed.
Some difficulties in working with NiCd cells were
the low energy density of the NiCd technology. Nine D-
size cylindrical cells were used in each battery. After
Shuttle-required safety measures were added to the
battery design and combined with the difficulty of
packaging cylindrical cells, the completed battery was
large and heavy.
Software Design Issues
The goal of the embedded software, as imple-
mented in ROM, for PANSAT is to provide simple and
reliable control of the spacecraft in order to upload
higher-level layers of software which are modifiable
from a ground station. PANSAT ROM software is
written almost entirely in C with some 80186 assembler
for critical code and the initial bootstrap software. The
ROM software is capable of autonomously operating
the spacecraft while listening for commands from a
ground station to either downlink telemetry or uplink
new data or software.
Although PANSAT is successfully operating non-
volatile Flash ROM, which is used to store telemetry,
the ROM software was designed assuming this experi-
mental storage might not function correctly. Thus,
lacking any permanent memory, the software is
designed to start up each time as if the spacecraft were
just ejected. However, this software is capable of
examining telemetry in Flash as well as the status of
spacecraft hardware to determine if indeed the space-
craft may have been operating in orbit prior to the
current restart. PANSAT experiences regular restarts
which cause one operating system controller computer
to shut down and the alternate one to startup. This
phenomena is discussed later in this paper.
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The spacecraft software bootstrap consists of
hardware initialization (including a check to ED AC and
resetting RAM to known values so as not to create
ED AC errors when accessing RAM). The ROM data is
relocated, floating point software emulation is setup
(there is no floating point capability in the 80186 nor is
PANSAT flying a coprocessor), and a C runtime
environment is established for the remainder of the
software to operate.
The main software consists of a master loop which
does not operate concurrent software tasks. This
simplified the design of the operating system, increased
the complexity of individual components of the master
loop (because of timing), and yet increased the reliabil-
ity of the reset of the watchdog timer in the EPS. All
software components of the master loop must operate
correctly before the section of code which manipulates
the watchdog timer. The master loop regularly per-
forms the following. A/D conversion and telemetry
saving begins the loop. Then, an iteration of the battery
charge monitor is performed which maintains correct
charge, discharge, and operation of the two batteries.
The communication system is then checked for possible
incoming data packets. Incoming data can occur at any
time and is implemented using interrupt service
routines and direct memory access. If incoming
packets are present they are examined and processed. If
a response from the spacecraft is needed then download
packets are prepared and packet download begins. As
in the uplink, direct memory access and interrupt
service routines handle the download of packets
invisibly for the master loop. The software then checks
telemetry for anomalies and applies corrections if
applicable. And finally, before the loop repeats, the
watchdog timer in the EPS is reset. As in the communi-
cation code, the update of the system clock and




As described earlier, one bit error correction and
two bit error detection of the entire 512 kbytes of RAM
available to the system controller microprocessor is
implemented with the ED AC circuitry. Although single
bit errors are automatically corrected upon reading or
writing either the byte or word from or to RAM, there is
no guarantee that the operating software will access all
RAM locations within the time needed to ensure that a
single bit error is corrected. In order to ensure that all
RAM locations are accessed regularly a RAM wash
routine is run regularly by the system software.
As implemented in the PANSAT ROM, the RAM
wash software operates as follows. The entire 512
kbytes of RAM are separated into 8192 blocks of 64
bytes each. A block wash is performed every 500 msec.
Thus, the entire 512 kbytes are washed every 4096
seconds (68.27 minutes). An estimation of the number
of SEUs expected in RAM was performed by Oechsel5
based upon data from UoSAT-2, a microsatellite similar
to PANSAT regarding its orbit and types of electronic
circuits. Conservative assumptions indicated that the
number of SEUs expected was to be 1.0 x 10'6 SEU/bit/
orbit. This equates to an expected time between
uncorrectable errors of 1.8 years assuming the RAM
wash occurs once per orbit. The orbital period of
PANSAT is 5739 seconds; and thus 4096 seconds per
RAM wash is suitable.
Single bit errors cause a hardware interrupt to
trigger an interrupt service routine which records the
RAM location (byte or word address) where the error
occurred within and the date and time of service.
PANSAT experiences on average about one detectable
single bit error in its RAM every day. At most, there
have been four bit errors in one day; however, more
than a single bit error per day is rare.
Since 4096 seconds RAM wash cycles are about
two thirds of one orbit, using the date and time of the
single bit error interrupt is useless when attempting to
determine PANSAT's position over the Earth. After
launch it was decided to modify the RAM wash
software to implement RAM wash cycles at much
higher frequencies. The software was changed to wash
a block every 1/60 of a second. Thus, the entire RAM
could be washed in 136.5 seconds. With an orbital
period of 5739 seconds, 136.5 seconds is 0.149 rad
(8.56°) which corresponds to a distance of 1035 km.
This is the maximum error of location of the spacecraft
at the time of the single bit error; and, on average, the
error in distance is about 516 km. Using this more
precise date and time of single bit error correction, the
approximate location of the spacecraft was determined.
Sixty-three data points were used with RAM wash
cycles of 4096 seconds to produce Figure 3. Approxi-
mately 90% of the single bit error locations were near
the region of the South Atlantic Anomaly t (SAA).
t The South Atlantic Anomaly is a local distortion of the
geomagnetic field causing a high average of radiation level in
a large area of the South Atlantic. This area is approximated
at -22.5° to -24.5° latitude and 312.5° to 317.5° east longi-
tude.
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Figure 3. ED AC Errors Using Fast RAM Wash.
Spacecraft Restarts
PANS AT has experienced frequent computer
restarts since launch. On average the spacecraft system
controller operates continuously for about three days
before it is restarted. The longest continuous operation
of a system controller on PANS AT is 30 days. Because
the elapsed time of a system controller is reset to zero
each time the microprocessor is restarted, the spacecraft
restart times can be translated to UTC. A restart implies
that the spacecraft reset. The exact reasons for resets
are not known. However, indirect implications due to
the state of the spacecraft prior to reset and just after
restart often indicate why a reset would have occurred.
A system controller can cause itself to be shut down by
failing to update a watchdog timer in the power system.
This timer will cause the operating system controller to
be powered off and the other system controller to be
powered on.
In general, there are several probable causes for a
restart7. These are: transmission, software upload
failure, commanded by NPS, communication state
change, A/D failure, power glitch, or unknown software
failure. Resets related to transmission are likely when
the spacecraft is operating on battery power only and
the battery is low in capacity. During transmission the
spacecraft can use over 1.5 Amps of current and the
switching peaks are over 2 Amps. Software upload
failures are an operational problem from the NPS
ground station. NPS can command the spacecraft to
switch to the other system controller which will cause a
restart. A communication state change can cause the
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operating system controller to power down and thus
allow the other to begin operating. This can occur after
all communication possibilities with a modem and RF
unit have been attempted without successful communi-
cation with NFS. A/D failures are possible with the
calibration or sample buffer operation. When these are
sensed the operating system controller will cause itself
to shutdown. Power glitches of unknown reasons can
cause the operating system controller to reset (not
necessarily shut down). And, unknown software errors
may cause a restart.
Transmission problems and command by NFS are
the reasons most often determined to cause the restarts.
Reducing transmissions while the spacecraft is in
eclipse and the batteries are of low capacity has been
achieved by modifying operations at the NFS ground
station. NFS commanding the restart is purely experi-
mental and has been minimized.
The other probable, but less likely causes are still
of a concern; however, there is little that can be done to
reduce these causes in the ROM software. Uploaded
software images have reduced the possibility of the A/D
failures and communication state changes by masking
off the A/D errors and increasing the time required to
make a communication state change. Regardless, each
restart begins with operating ROM software.
Spread Spectrum Mode of Communications
The PANS AT digital modem contains a PA-100
spread spectrum demodulator chip first produced by
Unisys Corporation. The PA-100 provides for flexible
data rates, modulation types, processing gains, PN
codes and loop control. External circuitry provides for
clock generation, differential coding, automatic gain
control and 70 MHz intermediate frequency (IF)
generation. The 70 MHz transmit and receive IF signals
connect to the RF section which contains the local
oscillators, low noise amplifiers, high power amplifiers
and power controller. The RF section feeds a matching
network that drives the tangential turnstile antenna
mounted on PANS AT to provide an omnidirectional
pattern with nulls not to exceed 3dBi.
PANSAT is designed to provide half-duplex digital
communications with a bit error rate not to exceed one
error in one hundred thousand. The required signal to
noise ratio was measured using a Noise Com precision
carrier to noise (C/N) generator to set the signal level
and a Hewlett Packard data error analyzer to verify the
bit error rate. The measured C/N was used to verify the
link budget calculations used to design the communica-
tions system. The link budget provides for a minimum
margin of 3dB under worst-case conditions.
The modem was designed to operate in two
different modes. The first is a 78k-bit narrow band
mode used for telemetry downloads and program
uploads. The second is a 9.8k-bit wide band mode used
for spread spectrum store and forward messaging. In
both cases the PA-100 modem chip requires software
table downloads to setup, acquire, and track the
incoming signal. The chip also requires constant
monitoring for signal detection along with table updates
to maintain a reliable link. The software overhead was
also increased by the half-duplex communications link
that PANSAT uses. During spacecraft integration it was
determined that the final software to provide the spread
spectrum mode of operation was not going to be ready
in time to meet the launch schedule. At that time the
narrow band mode was running so it was decided the
required software could be uploaded after on orbit
operations began.
PANSAT was launched as a secondary payload
utilizing a cylindrical carrier, with spring eject mecha-
nism. When PANSAT was integrated into the carrier the
four antenna blades came into contact with the inside
surface of the can. NASA required reforming the
antenna blades to maintain the correct payload clear-
ance. This operation, however, changed the radiation
pattern of the antenna system to an unknown.
Once on orbit operations began, the narrow band
mode proved to be reliable but unpredictable due to the
antenna issue. Several modifications to the ground
station antenna and amplifiers increased system
performance but slow program uploads and short
intervals between resets prevented spread spectrum
operation.
Conclusions
The PANSAT small satellite is the first autonomous
spacecraft developed by officer students at the Naval
Postgraduate School. A number of challenges were
overcome and lessons learned which will be addressed
with the follow-on project to PANSAT. Although the
spread spectrum aspect failed to materialize, the overall
design and engineering trades successfully validated the
overall design of the spacecraft, specifically, the use of
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components in a low-
cost, single-string spacecraft design.
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